


INTERACTIONS OF NAVY PROGRAM MANAGERS WITH
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THEIR
STAFFS

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THESIS

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by
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and
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March 1973

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1973

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the interactions between Navy Program Managers and the United States Congress. It describes the amount and type of interactions, and the formal organization in the Navy to deal with them.

Initial research was based on telephone and written surveys. This was followed by extensive personal interviews with Congressional staff members, Congressmen, DOD civilians, Congressional liaison personnel, and Navy Program Managers.

Congressional expectations or norms for their interactions with Program Managers are discussed, as well as Congressional views of what actually occurs. The effects of the discrepancies between Congressional expectations and Congressional images of how Program Managers act are described. Finally, some recommendations are made to help improve Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASN	Assistant Secretary of the Navy
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
HAC*	House Appropriations Committee
HASC*	House Armed Services Committee
NavCompLia*	Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations Committee Liaison Office
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OP 906	Naval Operations, Congressional and Policy Coordination Branch
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
SAC*	Senate Appropriations Committee
SASC*	Senate Armed Services Committee
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy

* Indicates that the abbreviations were originated by the authors and are not known to be commonly accepted.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is necessary at the outset of this thesis effort to discuss what we do not intend to accomplish. We do not, in any way, intend to provide a check list for Navy Program Managers, their offices, or for students studying to become Program Managers; nor do we claim to present a cure-all for problems in current Navy-Congressional relationships. It is true that at the beginning of this effort, some hope was attached to the idea of creating such a check list. In the course of the investigations which followed, it became evident to us that the large numbers and variety of Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions prohibited the development of any simple check list to be used on all, or even most, occasions.

What we hope the reader will gain from this thesis is an appreciation of the existing problems in this subject area. In addition, some suggestions are offered for Navy Program Managers and others involved in this area of Congressional interactions. These suggestions are advanced not as instant cures to the problems, but as ideas to be considered and discussed in the hopes that they will lead to an improvement in the current turbulent Navy-Congressional relations. Further, it is hoped that the information and facts which are presented will provide future students and Navy Program Managers with a better understanding of what they are likely to encounter in the Program Manager arena. It should be noted that while this thesis deals with Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions, many of the problems exist throughout the entire spectrum of Navy-Congressional interactions.

II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Initially our interest in Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions was sparked by the combination of several events. One was a course entitled, "Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis", [Ref. 1] which, among other things, presented some background on the Senate and House Appropriations Committees and their methods of operation. In addition, several Program Managers emphasized the excessive time devoted to testimonies and briefings for Congress [Refs. 2, 3, and 4]. Finally, several Navy programs had been under attack by Congress [Ref. 5] as being too costly, poorly managed, and/or unnecessary. Some preliminary research made it apparent that there was a large portion of the Navy Program Manager's business about which little documented information existed.

For the purposes of this research, it was first necessary to define what was meant by a Program Manager. We decided to use the Navy's list of designated, major Program Managers [Ref. 6]. In addition, where clearly delineated, program-like offices could be discovered, they were added to the official list. The final list of program offices solicited for information is included in Appendix A.

The first question which had to be answered was to what extent, if any, did these Navy Program Managers interact with Congress. Were there only a few Program Managers interacting with Congress, or did most have some dealings with Congress? If there were a significant number of Navy Program Managers interacting with Congress, what form did these interactions take? Were they in the form of appearances

before Congressional committees, or the simple answering of verbal queries and correspondence?

If there were a significant number of Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions, what procedures and/or guidelines had there been established in the Navy to deal with these interactions? Was there any formal organization to guide Program Managers or to give them aid? If such an organization existed, was it an intelligence gathering organization to warn Program Managers of pitfalls and areas of Congressional concern, or did it merely provide the contact point for Program Manager-Congressional interactions?

Much work has been done concerning Congressional relations with government agencies other than the Department of Defense (DOD). Some of the best documentation is contained in works by Fenno [Ref. 7] and Wildavsky [Ref. 8], two studies of appropriation's politics and processes. Among other things, they investigated House and Senate Appropriations Committees' interactions with non-DOD governmental agencies. Unfortunately, little similar work has been done for DOD-Congressional interactions. We hoped to determine what commonality existed between DOD and non-DOD interactions with Congress. While the major objective was a parochial one, that of examining Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions, a secondary objective was to take some initial steps toward filling the void in the literature on DOD-Congressional interactions.

It must be noted that only Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions were investigated. We do not mean to imply that all DOD, or all Navy, interactions with Congress are identical to those of the Navy Program Managers. It was not possible, nor desirable, in the time available to investigate all of the DOD-Congressional or the Navy-Congressional interactions. However, it can be pointed out that the Navy's procurement

share of the overall defense budget is significant.¹ (For the purposes of this thesis, procurement includes research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and the acquisition of weapons systems, which are those activities in which Program Managers are involved.) As such, the Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions reflect attitudes and actions of a significant number of senior Naval officers. Thus, while overall Navy-Congressional interactions were not explored in depth, those problems which occur between Navy Program Managers and Congress are in many ways representative of total Navy-Congressional troubles.

We not only wanted to study the interactions themselves, but we also wanted to investigate their effects on legislation and appropriations. It was hypothesized that poor interactions with Congress might lead to the "stretching-out" of programs, decreased funding for programs, or the curtailment of entire programs. Some grounds for this hypothesis are found in Fenno [Ref. 7, pp. 321-343]. He suggests that Congress samples to find "soft spots" or areas where programs are experiencing troubles, that they attempt to determine the character of the administrator, and that they collect information on programs to place in the public record. If any of these are to their disliking, Fenno suggests that cuts in the program may result. Of course, there are alternate explanations for program cuts: Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky [Ref. 10] suggests that simple decision rules are used by Congress to cut budget requests. Kanter [Ref. 11] claims that for DOD components, Congress makes selected cuts in order to effect national security policy. Jernberg [Ref. 12] suggests that different appropriations subcommittees investigate agencies

¹ Of an \$80.9 billion defense budget for FY 1973, the Navy's share for procurement and RDT&E was \$11.7 billion. Out of a requested \$85 billion for FY 1974, the Navy is allotted \$12 billion [Ref. 9].

in different ways: Some look at programs, some look at administrators, and some look at agency input data. We decided to investigate why Congressional committees and their staffs thought they cut Navy programs. It should be noted that our approach was the direct one of asking Congressmen and their staffs their perceived reasons as opposed to the indirect method of researching Congressional reports.

Finally, we wanted to investigate the effects of the Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions on the Navy and the Program Managers themselves. Did Program Managers change the way they interacted due to past experience? Did the Navy change its approach to Congressional interactions? Did the Navy view its interactions with Congress in a good or bad light?

In short, our objectives were to bring to light those interactions, if any, between Program Managers and the Congress. We desired to find the Congressional viewpoint of those interactions, what they thought should occur as opposed to what they actually observed happening. Where there were discrepancies, we hoped to discover their possible causes and any effects they might have.

After a brief discussion in Section III of the research design for obtaining information on topics of interest, Section IV will present the results of the research. It will start with a description of the Navy's organizational structure for dealing with Congress in IV. A. and then in IV. B. discuss the actual contacts which our research revealed. Section IV. C. will describe the Congressional viewpoint of what Program Managers should be doing. The discrepancies between these Congressional expectations and the Congressional perception of what actually occurs will be presented in IV. D. along with a delineation of some possible

causes for the discrepancies. Section IV. E. will review the effects of these discrepancies.

Finally, in Section V conclusions will be drawn and in Section VI the authors will offer recommendations.

III. DESIGN OF INVESTIGATION

Since there was so little documented information on DOD-Congressional interactions, initial research and reading was conducted in material related to non-DOD agencies [Refs. 7, 8, and 13]. Initially it was decided to pursue Fenno's approach and investigate Navy Program Manager interactions with the Appropriations Subcommittees. In order to investigate the question of the frequency of Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions, hearings for the past several years of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were examined. Although there was some evidence of Navy Program Manager interactions with the Appropriations Committees, the volume of such documented interactions was small. Later contact with the Navy Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations Committee Liaison Office (NavCompLia), whose assignment is to assist Navy personnel in their relationships with the Appropriations Committees, led to the conclusion that the research area must be broadened.

It was found through several phone calls to Navy Congressional Liaison personnel that the dealings of the Navy with Congress concerning procurement revolved primarily around four committees, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC), and the House Appropriations Committee (HAC).² Consequently it was decided to investigate interactions between Navy Program Managers and those four committees. (Actually, where the

² For justification of this assertion, see questionnaire results [Appendix B] which are discussed later. Of interest here is that out of fifty Program Managers responding, only three had any dealings with other committees.

Appropriations Committees are concerned, the Navy and DOD deal almost exclusively with the Defense Subcommittees of the HAC and the SAC, and not with the full committees. It should be understood that when the SAC and HAC are referred to, we actually mean the Defense Subcommittees of these committees.)

Research then followed a classical pattern. A sample telephone survey was made of six Navy Program Managers to determine what, if any, interactions they had with Congress. The telephone interviews ranged from fifteen to forty-five minutes in length with both authors on the line simultaneously. Detailed notes were taken for later review. These telephone interviews were also utilized to experiment with the form of various questions for later use in the questionnaire and in the personal interviews. Once it was established that there were at least some Program Manager-Congressional interactions, a questionnaire was sent to sixty-six Program Managers [Appendix B]. While waiting for the return of the questionnaires, further interviews were conducted with various people, both within and outside DOD, who had prior experience with Congress. Further research included past studies of selected cases of DOD-Congressional interactions such as The Admirals Lobby [Ref. 14] and The Politics of Weapons Innovation [Ref. 15]. Background information was gathered on the current members and staffs of the four committees [Refs. 16 and 17].

Since there was so little documented information available, the authors felt that information should be obtained, as much as possible, from those most familiar with Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions. Thus, the major input into the thesis came from two weeks of intensive interviews in the Washington, D. C. area. These interviews were not of a random sample of Washington bureaucrats but were of people

intimately involved in Congressional-Program Manager interactions. Forty-one people were interviewed in sessions which ranged from thirty minutes to three hours. Some of the appointments for interviews were made in advance by people at the Naval Postgraduate School who had contacts in the budgeting arena, others were arranged by interviewees interested in ensuring that the authors received sufficient detail in a specific area, still others were set up by Navy Congressional Liaison personnel. Finally, the authors arranged some interviews themselves when there seemed to be a logical need to investigate an area and contacts were not available.

The timing of the trip was carefully planned and turned out to be ideal. The interviews took place in early January, 1973, before the annual budget had been presented by the President. Many of the people interviewed were awaiting the arrival of the budget and, therefore, had time to talk in detail. Those interviewed included Navy Program Managers, Navy Congressional Liaison personnel, DOD lawyers and personnel involved in Navy budgeting activities. Perhaps more important, Congressmen, their personal staffs, and the staff members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees were interviewed. To ensure objectivity, we included Congressional opponents as well as proponents of defense. The staffs of the Appropriations Committees were covered more thoroughly than were the Armed Services staffs.

To highlight different viewpoints, the authors interviewed participants in a specific event (a SASC staff member briefing) which the authors also attended. These interviews were conducted separately to obtain each participant's impressions and viewpoints of the briefings. Those interviewed included the staff member, the Congressional Liaison representative, the Program Manager, and some of those Navy personnel assisting the Program Manager with his brief.

It was felt that, due to the limitations of time and currently available information, the authors should concentrate their attention on those most directly involved in the Congressional-Program Manager interactions. Those not interviewed, who might have had significant insight into the subject interactions include personnel from the Office of Management and Budget, civilian personnel from the office of SECNAV and the various ASN's and senior Naval personnel other than Program Managers or those in procurement billets such as appropriations' sponsors. Future researchers in this area might consider interviewing these people.

Prior to an interview, the authors reviewed the interviewee's role in Congressional-Program Manager interactions and, where available, biographical material about him. From facts learned in previous research and in interviews which might have already taken place, a series of questions were prepared which were tailored toward the individual interviewee. Often the questions served only as guidelines, as most interviewees needed to hear only our opening remarks and one or two questions, after which they would talk freely about the interactions and problems they observed. At times, there was so much interest generated that single interviews expanded into several sessions.

Both authors were present at all interviews and alternated taking notes and asking questions. This ensured that a train of thought could be pursued to completion without interruption or hesitation for writing. It also prevented time being wasted on idle conversation, since at least one of the authors would usually sense when it was appropriate to change the subject and ask a different question. After the interviews, the authors recorded their impressions on a tape recorder and compared notes

and ideas to ensure that both agreed on the facts presented. This helped ensure that facts were not misrepresented, omitted, or added as might be the case with a single interviewer. The tapes were saved, and later a written summary of each interview was prepared. Although these summaries are not included in the thesis due to their sensitivity, they are available for additional research through the authors, as is a list of the interviewees.

There were over seventy-five hours spent interviewing various participants in the Program Manager-Congressional interaction arena. These include the interviews in the Washington area as well as those conducted by telephone and in the Monterey area. Forty-five to fifty hours of those interviews were conducted in Washington. Over one third of the interviewees were Congressional personnel (Congressmen and staffs), and another third were Navy liaison personnel. The remainder were DOD civilians, Program Managers, and Deputy Program Managers.

It is the nature of such studies that the results depend on things which are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. In such cases it is the duty of the researchers to select those items that were common to many interviews as the ones to be presented and examined closely. A research methodology of this kind has been used many times in the past by political scientists investigating the Congress [Refs. 7, 8, 18, and 19]. The philosophy of science issues associated with observation, measurement, and explanation, along with their relationship to a research methodology such as the one adopted here, is discussed in Churchman [Ref. 20, Chap. 4].

The Washington research and interviews provided the major input to this thesis. It should be noted, however, that the success of the trip

was dependent on long and careful preparation by the authors, as well as careful cultivation of contacts provided by other people. Further, the timing of the trip was critical. By the end of the two-week period budget activity was increasing significantly. Many of those interviewed would not have been available or had time for talks at any other time of the year. It is unlikely that these people would be willing to discuss this material frequently or with anyone who did not have the proper recommendations. Research in the immediate future should probably eschew the interview and instead combine currently available interview results with secondary source material found in committee hearings and reports. All of this is said not to discourage future research in this area, but to suggest that the successful use of our methodology is dependent upon extensive preparation, proper contacts set up by other sources, and no small amount of luck.

IV. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY TO DEAL WITH CONGRESS


To understand the organizational structure of that part of the Navy that deals with Congress, it is first necessary to understand a small part of the budget cycle and the powers of the committees involved. Once the budget is submitted by the President to Congress, there are two phases which the military portion must pass through in each house of the Congress. As a result of legislation passed in 1959 [Ref. 21], all money for defense procurement must first be authorized by an authorization bill. This bill is written by the HASC and SASC and reported out to their respective chambers for passage. Once a program is authorized, the HAC and SAC can appropriate money for it in an appropriations bill. It should be noted that the authorization bill only places a ceiling limit on the amount of money to be spent in an area; the appropriations bill may be for considerably less than this amount. To paraphrase a frequently heard example: The authorization bill is like a hunting license, but you can't shoot bear until the gun has been appropriated. It should also be noted that the House and Senate versions of the bills frequently differ. After passage by the House and Senate, a compromise on the two authorization bills is agreed upon by a joint committee of the two chambers; the same is true of the two appropriations bills. Theoretically, the substantive committees (i.e., Armed Services) are supposed to concentrate on programs and their objectives while the Appropriations Committees are supposed to concentrate on financial questions. While this distinction is not

always true in non-defense areas [Ref. 7], our interviews indicate that it is reasonably accurate for defense.

There are two official contact points in the Navy for Congressional relations. The first of these, the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), is charged by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) [Ref. 22] to be the single point contact for Congress, with two exceptions, the HAC and the SAC. These two committees conduct their business with the Office of the Comptroller of the Navy and deal largely through the Appropriations Committee Liaison Office (NavCompLia). Navy Liaison personnel indicated that the reason for this split is that the Appropriations Committees have directed it. While the rest of Congress supposedly desires information on programs or specific problems, the Appropriations Committees want specific financial information. They desire to deal directly with those in the Navy (and other components of DOD as well as non-DOD agencies) who are responsible for the management of the finances. OLA reports directly to SECNAV whereas the Office of the Comptroller reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management, who reports to SECNAV. (See Fig. 1 for an abbreviated organization chart of the Navy indicating the relationship of these offices.)

Although the type of information which flows through each office may be different, the pattern of flow as described by various interviewees is the same. A request for information (as an example) might come from one of the Appropriations Committees to NavCompLia or from one of the Armed Services Committees to OLA. In both cases, the request is then forwarded to Naval Operations, Congressional and Policy Coordination Branch, (OP 906). OP 906 works for the Director of Navy Programming who works for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). OP 906 decides who in


Fig. 1 (Part 1)
 Department of the Navy Organization Chart, Abridged



To Fig. 1 (Part 2)

Fig. 1 (Part 2)

From Fig. 1 (Part 1)



the Navy would be most likely to have the requested information and forwards it to the designated office for staffing and research. If it is an item that will eventually be answered by a Program Manager, it reaches him by one of two paths. If OP 906 knows the Program Manager who should respond, they might send the request directly to him. Otherwise, it is forwarded to the Legislative Liaison Office in the particular Systems Command Headquarters involved and then to the Program Manager. (See Fig. 2 for a diagram of the information flow.) Once the information is collected, it is passed up this same chain and reviewed at each step. OP 906 is also responsible for determining whether the information presented should be cleared by any other parties. If so, they send it to such parties for clearance of additional information before returning it to OLA or NavComPLia. The types of items which might pass through this chain (Fig. 2) are requests for information, requests for briefings of committees or committee staff members (or individual Congressmen), review and editing of hearings, records, and additional material of interest to Congress.

The number and background of the personnel in these offices, at the time of our research, is of interest. OLA had thirty-six nonclerical personnel. While it was not certain that prior command of a military unit is a requirement for the office, one individual in OLA stated that he viewed it as a necessity for presenting the best image to Congress, and the majority of the people we met in OLA who might have direct contact with Congressional personnel had command experience. No other formal requirement for assignment to OLA was discernible. NavComPLia had two nonclerical personnel, and their only apparent prerequisite was that they have prior financial experience. OP 906 had five nonclerical




Fig. 2: Example of the Formal Information Flow Between Congress and Program Managers

personnel, and there was no apparent formal requirement (other than their rank) for the billets. The individual Legislative Liaison Offices ranged from one to four people and were, as nearly as could be determined, staffed entirely by civilians. Their background was mixed, ranging from prior legislative liaison work to having performed public affairs type work previously.

Each of these offices mentioned have more duties than merely forwarding information. While a detailed description is available elsewhere [Ref. 22], pertinent functions as described in interviews of OLA personnel are appropriate for discussion. Representatives of OLA attend all hearings and briefings³ of Congressmen, their staffs, and Congressional committees other than Appropriations. They prepare a summary of such hearings or briefings and send a copy to SECNAV, ASN, CNO, VCNO (Vice Chief of Naval Operations) and OP 906. These summaries include a list of the attendees, a brief account of what transpired, a discussion of central themes, and the OLA representative's impressions of any problems. In addition, the OLA representatives may try to prepare the witness/briefer by describing the room arrangement, describing the people who will be present, and listing possible questions. The amount of effort that goes into each of these preparations depends on the tempo of activities, the seniority of the witness, the sensitivity of the program, and the willingness of the witness to accept or seek help. Each of these aspects will be discussed in turn.

At this time, there are three Commanders in OLA, all of whom the authors interviewed extensively, who normally accompany witnesses to

³ The technical differences between hearings and briefings are discussed in Section IV. B. 1. of this thesis.

Congress, although there are others, generally more senior, within OLA, who can assist when required. As the tempo of hearings and briefings increases, it is not unusual for each of the three to have several events to cover in a single day. When this occurs, almost all of their effort is expended in attending the hearings/briefings and little effort can be devoted to preparing witnesses.

As might be expected the seniority of a witness affects the amount of attention he receives, but in an unexpected way. One might assume that a senior witness might receive more assistance in his preparations. Our interviews indicate, however, that it is generally assumed by OLA that the more senior a witness is, the more opportunity he has had to appear before Congress or its staffs at some time in his career. It is also assumed (to some extent by OLA and often to a larger extent by senior Naval officers interviewed) that prior experience with Congress makes one aware of most problem areas. This is not to say that OLA does not try to prepare the witness by giving him questions when known. However, the more senior a witness, the less detailed these potential questions are likely to be. OLA personnel volunteered that this was due, to some extent, to the natural reluctance of junior Naval personnel to appear to be giving detailed advice to senior officers who consider themselves proficient in a given subject area.

The sensitivity and size of a program has a predictable effect on the amount of pre-briefing a potential witness might receive. There are several reasons for this: If a program is under close scrutiny by Congress, the Navy tends to devote more attention to ensuring that the witness is given all possible help. He is expected to prepare extensively and must appear before several mock hearings/briefings. Also, since it

is usually a controversial program, there is more said about it in Congress, by the people investigating it, and by the media. This fact gives OLA more clues with which to work and often they are able to devise a more complete set of possible questions or points of Congressional interest. Finally, a Program Manager who has a program that is in trouble is more likely to seek information concerning areas of Congressional interest from anyone who might have it.

The willingness of the witness to accept or seek help has, perhaps, the greatest bearing on the amount and types of information received from OLA. This is especially true in the case of Program Managers. In the past, some Program Managers have refused OLA's offers of assistance. As a result, those interviewed in OLA indicated that they seldom offered unsolicited information to Program Managers.

There is a variety of information available through OLA for Program Managers. Various branches collect information about the action and attitudes of Congressmen and their staffs. Some of this information is collected by listening to floor action, some by researching voting records of individual Congressmen, some by the impressions and intelligence developed by listening to committee hearings and by accompanying staff members on trips. In addition, biographical and background data is available on Congressmen and their staffs. All of this information about the Armed Services Committees is available for use by Program Managers who desire to tailor their presentation to fit the interests and background of their audiences, and who wish to be aware of items which have been of interest to the particular committee, Congressman, or staff member in a recent time frame. Interviews with Program Managers indicated that they are not generally aware this information is available.

NavComPLia has basically the same duties as the Congressional Committees Liaison branch of OLA [Ref. 22], but our research indicates that their method of operation is quite different. While potential question areas provided by committee staff members are forwarded to possible witnesses, and while NavComPLia personnel attend the hearings and some of the briefings of the Appropriations Committees, their intelligence gathering efforts are minimal compared to OLA or non-DOD agencies. For example, as OLA does for the Armed Services Committees, NavComPLia prepares a summary of Appropriations hearings; however, they prepare no summaries of Appropriations briefings. Further, NavComPLia has no personnel to collect or maintain biographical material. (As mentioned before, NavComPLia had two functional personnel as opposed to approximately thirty-six in OLA). Whatever intelligence is gathered concerning individuals and trends appears to be on a somewhat haphazard, unorganized basis.

As previously discussed, OP 906 coordinates Congressional inquiries within the Navy. In interviews they told us that they are charged with ensuring that answers to questions and other information forwarded to Congress and its staffs reflect current Navy policies. They are also responsible for ensuring that replies given to various groups are consistent with other replies and with previous positions taken by the Navy. They review testimony for consistency and inform CNO of what information is flowing to the Congress. (It must be remembered that OLA and NavComPLia work for SECNAV and do not report directly to CNO.) Furthermore, they are responsible for providing "point papers" and position papers for CNO on pertinent items of interest, and they serve as his personal back-up men when he appears before the committees of Congress.

This combination of duties has a predicted effect, especially with only five people in the office. It is the character of the current CNO to be an activist, and he requires extensive staff work for Congressional relations. Since OP 906 is the central clearing house for this information, they appear to concentrate their efforts on satisfying the CNO. An effect of this as viewed by other officers in the system is that there is insufficient time for OP 906 to follow up on all requests for information and for policy coordination. This is seen as necessitating a second, or even a third, Congressional request.

The Congressional Liaison offices within the Systems Command Headquarters are the final link in the liaison chain. As previously mentioned, they are frequently by-passed. Much of their work involves answering, or ensuring that someone answers, the technical questions posed by Congress. They have the specialized knowledge of the matrix form of management of the individual Systems Commands which enables them to identify the individual to task for a specific answer. They also have a working knowledge of Congress, and sometimes substitute for the SECNAV OLA personnel at briefings and hearings as required. Many of the Systems Commands liaison personnel are long-tenured civilians. While they don't have as much direct contact with the Congress as the SECNAV OLA personnel, their long exposure to Congress often appears to give them a sense of history about the Congressional process which does not exist in any other part of the Navy Liaison system. They are manpower limited and don't have readily available the extensive information that the SECNAV OLA possesses. However, the liaison personnel indicated they can obtain most of this information from SECNAV OLA. A Program Manager can obtain some assistance from them in preparation for Congressional appearances.

Now that the Navy structure for Program Manager-Congressional interactions has been described, the results of our investigations into the frequency and types of these interactions will be discussed.

B. ACTUAL PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS

1. Form of Contacts

Sixty-six questionnaires were sent to Program Managers; fifty responses were received. (See Appendix B.) It is noteworthy that of the fifty replies, forty-two indicated some dealings with Congress, many of which were quite extensive and repetitive. These interactions fall into four categories: hearings, briefings of Congressmen and/or Congressional committees, briefings of committee staff members, and responding to questions of Congress and staffs.

Hearings are formal sessions where the Congressional committee members question witnesses about specific items, general items, or both. These questions and their answers are recorded and published in hearing's books (with security deletions). These sessions satisfy several purposes. They are both for gathering information and placing it in the public record. They are used by the Chairman as a means to inform and to train junior members, and they serve as a method for the Congress to deliver its wishes to agency personnel. Presentations tend to be somewhat formal, are generally not conducted in great depth (although there are numerous exceptions), and are often done by senior Naval officers [Ref. 23]. In-depth interviews indicate that with the exception of controversial, large dollar programs, Program Managers generally act only as back-up witnesses. Although the answers to the question about the preparation for hearings (question one of Questionnaire in Appendix B) lead one to believe that many Program Managers participate in hearings, further investigation revealed that this was due to a poor choice of words in the question. Actually a large number of Program Managers (thirty-three of the fifty who replied) must prepare as potential back-up witnesses, but some that prepare do not appear for

the actual hearings, and few actually testify. It is not unusual for a Program Manager to appear as a back-up witness for a senior officer (usually an Appropriations sponsor) and never be called upon to testify.

Briefings of Congressmen fall into two classes: The first is the briefing of an individual Congressman (or a group of them) who simply wants to be informed about a specific area. The second is the briefing of a committee or some portion of a committee. The latter is usually conducted as a form of pre-hearing research on the part of the committee. They often investigate areas more deeply than in hearings and may frequently be looking for areas that they want to place in the public record. Program Managers frequently become involved in briefings, especially before the Armed Services Committees. Of the fifty responding Program Managers, thirty-two had to brief at least one committee or subcommittee one time, twenty-five had been involved in more than one Congressional briefing. Twenty-seven had appeared before the SASC or one of its subcommittees; thirteen had appeared before SAC (subcommittee on Defense). The difference between the numbers of those Program Managers briefing ASC and Appropriations Committees is probably due to the different outlook of the committees. It must be remembered that the Appropriations Committees tend to look at line items whereas the Armed Services Committees look at program items.

Program Managers are frequently involved in the briefings of committee staff members. Question seven of the questionnaire asked about Program Manager briefings of staff members only as a part of all contacts with staff members, so the numbers are not conclusive; however, thirty-eight of the fifty respondents had briefed or had other contacts with staff members.

Since Congressmen have many obligations other than their committee work, they often can not study programs and budget requests in any great detail. Consequently they depend, to a large extent, on their committee staffs to perform this detailed work. Interviews indicate that more Program Managers brief staff members than Congressmen or than appear at hearings. Staff members spend most of their time keeping current on programs in their specialty areas (especially specific problem areas). Those interviewed were frequently knowledgeable about even minor technical details of programs. Staff briefings are generally informally conducted affairs where Program Managers update the history of their program, and staff members ask questions. Staff members indicated that they are generally searching for problem areas which might require cuts in the budget request, or very occasionally, areas where they feel DOD has not requested sufficient funding. They want to provide questions for their committee members in the areas where they know interest exists or where they feel interest should exist. Thus, it would appear that the briefings of the staff by a Program Manager could have a significant effect on the program.

The final form of contact between Program Managers and Congress is the response by Program Managers to requests for information. These requests usually originate from one of three sources. The first is a request from committee staff members for detailed information, either because a briefing didn't include the desired information, or because of some recent change in the program. The second is for information to be supplied to the formal hearing record which was not available during the actual hearing. The third is the request for the answer to a specific question or problem from a Congressman, usually referred to as a constituent problem. This may take the form of questions like, "Why didn't

Company XYZ of my state receive the contract for System A?" Most requests of these types flow through the OLA (or NavComplia) and OP 906 system. Occasionally a Congressman or staff member will call directly for information in which case the Program Manager must decide whether to answer directly or stall for time and send the answer through official channels. It should be noted that if the answer is given directly, it is the responsibility of the Program Manager to inform OLA or NavComplia, in writing, of what transpired [Ref. 24].

The questionnaire results indicated that many Program Managers have one or more of these interactions (hearings, briefings of committees, briefings of staffs, and responses to requests for information) at least annually, and fifteen of the fifty described the formal contacts as occurring more frequently. Eight Program Managers indicated that they had experienced no Congressional interactions. Several indicated that this might be attributed to the fact that they had been a Program Manager for only a short period of time. Further investigation revealed that the number, frequency, and timing of these interactions are dependent on the phase of the budget cycle, the extent of unfavorable publicity, the impression the presenter made the previous year, program size, program cost, and the amount of past committee interest, especially unfavorable.

Having described the actual Program Manager-Congressional contacts, we now discuss the Program Manager views of preparation for these contacts.

2. Preparation for Contacts

The questionnaire results (questions three and six), combined with interviews of Program Managers, show that there are mixed feelings

by Program Managers on how to prepare for testimonies/briefings. The split was about even on whether they thought one should concentrate on the technical aspects of the program or on both technical aspects and techniques of presentation. Interviews with Program Managers and other Navy personnel who did not feel techniques were important revealed a common feeling: Most Naval officers, especially senior officers, can speak well on a topic about which they are knowledgeable. They also felt that since Program Managers are, or should be, completely knowledgeable about their program, there is little need to worry about the quality of their presentations. Those who were concerned with techniques emphasized the need for presentation aids (movies and slides) rather than other techniques, such as changing the manner and form of presentation to appeal to the backgrounds and interests of the Congressional audience.

All Program Managers felt that technical knowledge of their program was important, and all (except the new Program Managers) felt they had a good grasp of the problems within their program and of the technical details. Most of those interviewed had a standard presentation which they updated as new information became available. Although the Program Manager's time is largely consumed by the management of his program, the manager of a large and/or controversial program normally must conduct numerous briefings which include some or all of the following: The appropriations sponsors, DOD personnel, SECNAV personnel, military and non-military activities, and finally, Congressional committees and staff members. After a few of these presentations, the briefing follows a standard format. There was evidence that some Program Managers believed that Congressional briefings were just one more of many, and that having successfully conducted the multitude of briefs in the DOD arena, there was no reason to especially worry about Congress.

There are specific steps taken by some Program Managers in preparation for Congressional appearances as discussed in a speech by a senior Naval Procurement Officer [Ref. 4]. If our interviews are representative, few Program Managers perform all of the items which follow; many do none of them. Some prepare by studying the prior year's records of hearings and reports.⁴ They determine what types of questions were asked and, for their program, what answers were given. They search for trends. A few Program Managers reported that they ask others who have testified/briefed recently the types of questions being asked. Some have personal contacts on the committee staff who will let them know of potential question areas. Program Managers will occasionally ask OLA (or NavComPLia) to find out what questions are likely to be asked. Other Program Managers have a mock hearing/briefing with their staff and require the staff members to ask difficult questions.

In addition to all of the foregoing, most Program Managers of major programs must go through a "murder board" which is a presentation of the potential Congressional brief before senior personnel from either the Systems Command involved or from OPNAV. The members of the board are supposed to ensure that the witness is well prepared. OLA (or NavComPLia) personnel are frequently on the board and can critique the presentation from the Congressional viewpoint. Many Program Managers

⁴ Committee reports are summaries of hearings with recommendations and sometimes back-up material that are released by committees at the completion of hearings when they make their recommendations to the chamber. Since a bill may be very short (especially an Appropriations bill), it is often necessary to read the committee report to determine the intent of the committee in the making of a law. Reports have the force of law and are used by the Government Accounting Office when interpreting the intent of a bill or resolving ambiguity. They further serve to highlight specific areas of committee interest.

who had been before these boards indicated, however, that the boards provided little assistance to them in preparing for Congress. It appeared to some that the only accomplishment of the board was to provide a means for updating others on their program.

As mentioned before, a few Program Managers indicated that they prepared for Congressional interactions by researching the backgrounds and interests of the people before whom they were going to speak; most interviewed did not. Those who didn't stated that they felt it was unimportant to tailor a presentation to fit an audience. Of those who indicated that they would change their presentation to fit a group, but would not study backgrounds of the group, most said that they depended on questions from the audience to guide them as to how to tailor their presentations. Some Program Managers mentioned that they would use background information if it were readily available, but that they did not think it was. Few showed any knowledge of the material available in OLA or in commonly available publications such as the Congressional Directory [Ref. 16]. The idea of having a common presentation for all four of the Congressional committees is further fostered by Navy instructions: "There should be common preparation for appearances before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees or their respective Subcommittees." [Ref. 22, p. 3.]

As mentioned in Section IV. A., there are few pre-briefing services given to the Program Managers by OLA or NavComPLia. The reasons given for this fact were the lack of time on the part of all concerned, the feeling of OLA and NavComPLia that their services are not desired by Program Managers, and the feeling on the part of Program Managers that OLA and NavComPLia have little useful information. Some stories were told of pre-briefings occurring in a car on the way to the briefing.

There is one type of Program Manager-Congressional interaction for which there can be little preparation. This is the sudden request for information, either through the OLA(NavCompLia)-OP 906 chain or over the telephone from some Congressman, or his staff member. According to several Program Managers, the best preparation for this type of interaction is to be totally knowledgeable of your program at all times. There are two ways Program Managers can respond to these types of requests; either by passing a written or verbal answer through the official hierarchy or by responding immediately by telephone. Each Program Manager seemed to have his own approach, but those who more frequently answered by telephone emphasized that the official channels could take a week or more to forward information to Congress and many felt that events moved too fast in their programs to permit such a delay. However, the officially correct method is to respond in writing [Ref. 25].

Sections IV. A. and IV. B. have discussed the organization of the Navy for dealing with Congress, the interactions which actually occur, and Program Manager preparations for those interactions. In Sections IV. C. and IV. D. we will discuss the Congressional views of what Program Managers should be doing in their Congressional interactions and what they view Program Managers actually doing.

C. WHAT PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD BE DOING - FROM A CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINT

The following descriptions of Congressional expectations of Program Managers are gleaned from the interviews with Congressmen, their personal and committee staffs, and a few civilians in DOD who have been successful participants in the overall military-Congressional interactions for a number of years. These expectations can be applied, to a large extent,

to any Navy witness. In fact, some of the ideas presented will apply more to the Navy as a whole than to Program Managers. It is of interest that most of these expectations follow in the tradition of the literature on Appropriations Committees [Refs. 7, 8, and 13].

1. Know Congress

Congress looks upon itself as one of the most important bodies of government in the world. Our research, as well as others [Refs. 7 and 8], indicates that Congressmen feel that it behooves people appearing before them to understand the way they operate. They have certain traditions and customs, and they feel that potential witnesses should be aware of them. The following are specific items related to the expectations that a Program Manager and the Navy in general should know the Congress.

With respect to Program Managers, there are a number of differences in the way the four primary committees work and view their roles. For instance, in recent years the SASC has become quite expert in weaponry and individual weapons systems. Research indicates that members see themselves as trying to force economies on the services and feel that one way to accomplish this is by cutting programs which are not needed. The Appropriations Committees, especially in the House, look more at how the dollars are managed than at the need for a program. Staff members state that these committees expect Program Managers to be aware of these differences in their interests and to present information accordingly. They expect the information to be presented in a form with which they are familiar and at a technical level that they can comprehend. They also expect the Program Manager to recognize the intelligence of the committee members, many of whom have extensive business and legal backgrounds.

A consistent comment from Congressmen and their staffs was that Congressmen expect Program Managers to recognize the demands placed on their time: demands of getting re-elected, answering constituent problems, serving on other committees, and many other duties. These demands serve to ensure that there is never enough time in the day for a Congressman to devote adequate attention to urgent committee matters and to understand all the aspects of a problem.⁵ As a result, Congressmen consciously depend on their personal staffs and, to a greater extent, on the committee staffs, to be experts in the specific subcommittee fields.

Committee staff members are expected to prepare the questions for the Congressmen on sensitive and important areas. Although there are exceptions, and staff members state that Congressmen have methods of ensuring that the desired items are selected; by and large, Congressmen leave the selection of items for investigation to the staff members. This means the staff member must be the one who investigates problems in great detail. As a result, staff members state that they desire the current program information in order that they, in turn, can indicate areas of interest and provide questions to their committee members. Because of the expertise developed by this research, staff members often help in the writing of the final bill and report [Ref. 13]. The point is, Congress expects Program Managers, and the Navy, to recognize the importance of committee staffs and to cooperate fully with them.

Another consistently mentioned expectation of Congress is that Program Managers listen to the signals, or hints, which are given. In the

⁵ For further discussion of the problem of multiple demands on a Congressman's time, see Ref. 26.

hearings and briefings Congressmen and staffs often express opinions of how things should be accomplished and what should be done in specific areas. Further more explicit signals might be given in the report which accompanies each bill. While recognizing that not all suggestions should be followed and that some suggestions may be naive, Congressmen expect most of their suggestions to be considered and generally adhered to. Many times these suggestions involve overall Navy policy over which the Program Manager has no control; in which case the Congress expects the Navy to take heed. This is especially true when the interest or concern of a committee is expressed repeatedly, year after year. Even though the Program Manager has little control over Navy policy, non-compliance with Congressional wishes by the Navy can affect his program as will be discussed later.

2. Be Honest and Provide Information

The comment that Program Managers and other witnesses should be honest was made so often and by so many people, both on the Congressional side and the military side, as to appear trite. The Navy even mentions it in its general publication for witnesses [Ref. 23].⁶ However, there is more involved in being "honest," as Congress sees it, than just answering a question truthfully. As one staff member explained it, Congressmen and their staffs will unintentionally ask a question in such a manner that it can be answered without revealing anything, but if it were phrased slightly differently, the answer would reveal

⁶ In our opinion this publication deserves far more credit than it seems to receive. When read carefully, it provides an informative description of hearings, briefings, the authorization-appropriations process, and general guidelines for witnesses. Some of the guidelines are couched in general terms, however, and deserve better and more thorough treatment.

considerable information of interest to the committee. This may be due to the Congressmen not having the technical background to phrase the question to obtain the information desired. Congressmen realize that they need information both for themselves and for the record, and they hope that the answers provided will include adequate material to cover the general subject area. Thus, they would prefer that the witness answer what one DOD official referred to as the "real question" that is being asked. They don't want to be given answers that skirt the issue or that are strictly uninformed and exaggerated talk. If a Program Manager doesn't know the answer, they expect to be told that fact.

Congressional personnel stated that they expect to be given correct information promptly when it is requested. Although staff members claim they generally do not request a specific witness from DOD, preferring rather to request a particular briefing and to let DOD pick the witness, they generally indicated that it is preferable to talk to the man in the Navy who is most knowledgeable on a topic. In the case of programs most felt this should be the Program Manager.

Congress further expects information to be consistent from year to year. Staff members stated that one of the methods which Congress uses as an indicator of program troubles is inconsistent answers, both within a single year and from one year to the next.

3. Characteristics of Program Managers

Interviews indicated that Congress expects much the same of a Program Manager that other researchers suggest the HAC expects of any agency administrator [Ref. 7]. They expect him to be totally knowledgeable of his program and of all its facets. They expect him to be an efficient administrator. A consistent statement was that he should be

willing to admit mistakes when they have occurred rather than trying to defend actions which led to the mistake. They expect to find in the Program Manager someone they can trust to administer the millions of dollars being given his program.

As part of being knowledgeable about his program, they often expect a Program Manager to know how his program compares to similar programs (as the F-14 versus the F-15) and how it affects, or is affected, by other programs. For instance, if it is a missile that is being designed to be placed aboard a new class of ships, what will happen to his program if the building of those ships is delayed? This expectation was voiced more by Armed Services personnel than by Appropriations personnel. He must be aware of, and able to answer, criticisms which may be raised by various critics within and without the military. SASC personnel stated that he must convince Congress of his ability to manage the program as well as the need for the program and for the requested amounts of funding.

4. Other Items

The interviews revealed some items that applied more to the Navy as a whole than to Program Managers. The first of these is the habit of bringing problems to Congress for solution. Some Congressmen stated that Congress would prefer the military to not force it to decide between similar or substitutive programs; they believe this should be done within DOD.

Another item which surfaced primarily from discussions with DOD and non-DOD civilian budgetary experts was the concept of having "something to give up." According to these experts this requires recognition of the fact that staff members and Congressmen feel it is

important to cut waste out of the budget. A ploy used by other agencies is to have items in the budget that they fully expect to be cut so that other, truly necessary, items will be passed without reduction in funding or fundamental changes. One staff member referred to this process as "Chinese arithmetic"--which requires study to see what is actually happening. He mentioned the fact that often money is cut out of one program, and the fact publicized, only to be given without fanfare to some other program. Thus, the committee and the staff members have received the needed publicity, and yet the agency receives its money.

A final item concerns the rotation and generalist (jack-of-all-trades) policies of the Navy. The opinion was repeatedly expressed by Congressmen and their staffs that allowing a good Program Manager to remain in his job would aid in the building of trust. The Appropriations Committee personnel also would like to see a career pattern in financial management.

D. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF PROGRAM MANAGERS AND REALITY--WITH POSSIBLE CAUSES

This part describes the existing differences between Congressional expectations of Program Managers and what actually happens. These differences were gleaned from the interviews and include both those viewed by Congress and Program Managers as well as those which are perceived only by Congress.

After each statement of a difference between expectations and perceived reality, the authors will discuss some possible causes for these discrepancies. These possible causes include some suggested by Congressional personnel, some advanced by DOD civilians, and some offered by Navy personnel--Program Managers and Liaison Personnel. In

addition, the authors have, in some cases, offered their own hypotheses of possible causes. While the discrepancies in fact are seen to exist by Congressmen and their staffs, as well as other participants in the Program Manager-Congressional interactions, the possible causes are offered for consideration and as ideas for further research.

1. Know Congress

Both staff members and DOD budgetary personnel stated that the average Program Manager has very little detailed understanding of Congress and the way it operates. They frequently remarked on the lengthy time period required by a Program Manager to understand the ways of Congress. This may not seem surprising when one considers the role of Congress in a Naval Officer's life prior to his becoming a Program Manager. In all likelihood, he has studied Congress in a high school civics course and possibly in a college-level political science course. Since then the Program Manager has been acquiring the technical competence and operational experience that led to his becoming a Program Manager. Since the average Naval Officer has an aversion to "politics" [Ref. 14, p. 9], he has probably avoided studying the political mechanizations of Congress. Few Naval Officers have served in a billet that dealt directly with Congress.

Appropriations staff members strongly emphasized that most Program Managers don't understand the real differences between the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees. This is not to say they don't understand the authorization-appropriation process, which they do. But few are aware of the differences in history

of the committees⁷ or of the differences in the committee outlook and interests. Most Program Managers interviewed felt that one committee was no different from another, just that some showed more interest in their program. As discussed earlier, the Navy system appears to promote similar treatment of all committees by directing witnesses to have common preparation for the different committees [Ref. 22, p. 3]. One could argue that the consistency expectation of Congress demands common preparation. However, it is not necessarily inconsistent to present information on the same program in two different forms, thus allowing the individual interests of the committee to be met without excessive questioning on their part. OLA representatives pointed out that the parts of the Navy which should be most capable of outlining the differences of the various committees (OLA and NavComPLia) are separated from each other. Both NavComPLia and OLA personnel appear to feel that this physical separation contributes to a lack of understanding of the committee differences.

Although Program Managers are provided the general areas of interest that should be discussed at a briefing/hearing, most of the Congressional personnel interviewed felt that Program Managers did not give the information desired by them in a manner which could be easily comprehended. A large portion of this was seen by them as being due to a failure on the part of the Navy to listen to the signals of Congress and act accordingly. Some DOD civilian personnel pointed out that the

⁷ Even OLA and NavComPLia personnel indicated that, as far as they knew, the authorization-appropriation process had existed in its present form since there had been an Armed Services Committee. As pointed out earlier, however, this present form is an outgrowth of an act passed in 1959.

technical nature of a Program Manager's background almost certainly ensures that without adequate guidance, his briefs will tend toward the technical aspects of his program. Even though he purposely makes his briefs clear and simple, staff members stated that the meetings were often a waste of their time as information covered was not that which was desired.

A possible cause for the communications breakdown may be seen in the fact that OLA frequently does not give Program Managers a thorough brief prior to hearings/briefings unless specifically requested to do so. Conversely, many Program Managers stated that they feel a Congressional briefing is just one of many they have conducted, and it thus requires no special attention. A possible problem with such thinking was emphasized by a prominent DOD civilian when he described the briefings and adversary relationships within DOD as being friendly, whereas those before Congress are deadly serious, and Congress should be viewed as true adversaries. Thus, there does appear to exist a situation where Program Managers may feel they need no pre-brief and ordinarily, one is not voluntarily offered by OLA or NavCompLia. Staff members volunteered that in these briefings it is quite possible for Program Managers to say, or do, something wrong and not even be aware of it until the program funding is cut. At that point, it is too late to change.

Staff members indicated that Program Managers have at times treated Congressmen as if they lacked the intelligence to understand their presentation. In our research some Program Managers did in fact refer to Congressmen as being cynical, ignorant, and illogical. The Congressional reactions to technical briefs/hearings may contribute to the idea in

Navy Program Manager's minds of an ignorant Congress. Non-technically oriented people, grasping at technical problems, ask questions which may seem meaningless to the technically oriented presenter. Frequently the questions may seem to indicate a complete lack of understanding of the problems concerned. Perhaps Program Managers view this as showing a general lack of intelligence; this possibly leads to their derogatory descriptions of Congress.⁸ While there is no hard evidence to prove it, one must speculate that such contempt may be evident to some extent in the presentations.

Congress expects Program Managers to appreciate the importance of committee staffs to the overall committee system. Our investigation and those of others [Refs. 7 and 8] indicate that staff members frequently have a major input into hearings and the actual write-up of a bill and report. This is due to their technical knowledge, tenure, and ability to influence the questions. Our interviews revealed that staff members feel that not all Program Managers appreciate the status and role of the staff in Congress. As a result, staff members feel that information passed to them often is incomplete, incorrect, or not well thought out. There was a case related to the authors of testimony being given in a hearing, coupled with the claim by the presenter that the staff members had been given the same information when, in fact, they had not. To appreciate the effect such events had on staff members, it was only necessary to hear the bitterness in their voices when they discussed it.

Finally, the Navy is viewed by practically all Congressional personnel and DOD civilians interviewed as not listening to the signals

⁸ This is obviously a very difficult area to discuss in an interview. However, it is a very fertile area for further research, but will require delicate questioning.

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from Congress nor following their expressed wishes. A possible partial explanation of this is that it runs counter to Navy-DOD traditions. The military tends to see itself as being in the best position to make decisions on what they perceive as purely military decisions once the funding is given to them [Ref. 14]. However, Congress frequently believes that some military decisions have political implications. They feel that they are best qualified to make these decisions [Ref. 27, p. 307]. When these views conflict, the military is seen as frequently avoiding following the wishes of Congress which run counter to the military wishes until they are forced to by law.

A further explanation for this discrepancy between expectations and reality may be that expressions and wishes of Congress about items which a Program Manager controls may not even be known at the Program Manager level. For example, some Program Managers were not aware of the contents and nature of a committee report. Most who mentioned it viewed it as an indication of the areas in their program which needed "covering-up" rather than changing. Few were aware of the memory Congress has and thus felt that if an item were mentioned one year it would often be forgotten by the next year. If it wasn't mentioned the second year, many considered the item a dead issue.⁹

The sheer number of Congressional requests, both constituent and Congress originated, is another factor advanced by OLA and OP 906

⁹ For an example of Congressional memory the reader is directed to the record of the interest of HAC in proficiency flight pay. Interest in this subject has existed sporadically since 1947, and the most recent result was the law to cancel proficiency flight pay for senior officers as of 1 July 1973.

interviewees that helps strain Program Manager-Congressional relations. Often the Program Manager is not sure whether a query is a routine constituent one requiring only a perfunctory reply, or a personal one from a Congressman or staff member requiring a detailed answer. He must react in the same manner to all queries. It is conceivable that after receiving a multitude of requests, a busy Program Manager might tend to give lip service to all queries and not allocate adequate attention to the pertinent ones, in which case requests received by the Program Manager which have meaning and which could return to haunt a program and the Navy would be lost in the plethora of requests which are made to satisfy constituents.

2. Be Honest and Provide Information

Navy Program Managers are generally described by the Congressmen and their staffs interviewed as being truthful and honest only in the strictest sense of the word. As previously mentioned, the term honesty means more in the Congress's mind than a formally correct answer to a specific question. Here there was an almost universal condemnation of Program Managers and of the Navy. Congressmen and their staffs interviewed felt that Program Managers frequently were not telling the full truth, that they avoided discussion of problem areas in their programs, and that they avoided answering more than the specific question. Many Program Managers seemed to agree with this and felt that this is what was expected of them by the Navy.

One hypothesis suggested by the authors for this is the aforementioned differing views the Congress and the Navy have of their own and each others' roles. Although there are some in the Navy who view the Congress as the final arbitrator in disputes over the distribution

and use of resources [Ref. 15], most in the Navy see Congress only as a body to authorize and appropriate money for programs designed to meet a military threat [Ref. 14]. These latter individuals feel that it is the Navy's responsibility, by law and training, to recognize and define said threat and to design weapons to meet it. They also feel that the Congress needs only enough information to ensure that the general programs are necessary, not the detail needed to judge specific program needs or management. Conversely, while Congressmen express a desire for the military to solve their own problems, they see the Navy as the service which is responsible for highly controversial and expensive programs, such as the DD-963, F-14, CVAN-70, and others. They feel that there has been mismanagement and that the Navy may be procuring systems which, even if properly managed, are too expensive to meet the perceived threat [Ref. 28]. Feeling thus, Congress wants considerably more information than the Navy desires to provide, in order that they can make their own judgments on the system need and the quality of management.¹⁰ This conflict in perceived roles must often be resolved by a Program Manager who must decide whether to keep the Congress happy by giving full information or to keep his Navy seniors happy by only giving that information which has been previously approved. The Program Manager reaction runs the full gamut from almost full disclosure to passing only fully sanitized information. Most Program Managers seemed to be forced into some middle position of trying to keep both groups satisfied.

Pressure, either implied or actual, from senior officers to withhold unsanitized information is recognized by Congress. This was one

¹⁰ This problem is just one more form of the traditional constitutional separation of powers problem.

of the reasons suggested by Congressional staff members for the common complaint of not being allowed to talk to the person that has the information they need. For weapons systems they mentioned that the Program Manager is frequently not the one sent to discuss a program even though he has responsibility for the program. When the Program Manager does appear, he is often accompanied by officers senior to him and allowed to talk only about the technical aspects of his program. Whether it is true or not, the Congressmen and their staffs perceive this entourage as limiting the Program Manager in the information that he can give. Appropriations staff members voiced the complaint of facing a "sea of blue" (a room full of witnesses) when the Navy appears to testify or brief. (One gets the impression that they feel cowed by the sheer numbers of witnesses, and they resent it.)

Complaints about the weight of the hierarchy between Program Managers and Congress were voiced by Program Managers as well as the Congress. Many Program Managers complained that one of their biggest problems was having too many people willing and eager to speak for their program--people with little specific knowledge of their program and who often gave incomplete or incorrect information. Also, Program Managers claimed they often have information which they know Congress desires and they want to forward, but that the Navy hierarchy prevented any such exchange. We witnessed one Program Manager have his briefing with a committee staff member canceled for no announced reason. Upon investigation he found the Navy had canceled the brief, and the Program Manager then had to fight through the system to have the brief rescheduled.

A related problem is one of consistency. Both Congressional personnel and the Program Managers verified that the story given Congress

is often inconsistent, but they had different explanations for this inconsistency. Congressional personnel consistently complained of a Navy reluctant to pass on information. When the information was forwarded, the inconsistent answers gave the impression of a Navy not giving the complete truth. Program Managers said that frequently people were, in fact, giving the complete information as they knew it, but that they didn't have all the facts, and, therefore, the answers seemed inconsistent. In non-DOD agencies, Congress often recognizes that the facts may change and that the witness may not have the latest information, especially if they know the witness and have decided they can trust him. Congress does not presently have this same trust in the Navy. This could be attributed to many causes, and staff members stated that the short tours were a contributing factor.

3. Characteristics of Program Managers

Congressional personnel gave mixed ratings of Program Managers. They saw most Program Managers as being technically qualified and as knowing their programs. However, they admitted that they have probably viewed some as incompetent to manage a program when, in fact, the only problem was that the person was not prepared to appear before Congress.

Congressional and DOD personnel stated that many military witnesses appear before Congress with a self-assured attitude which was often perceived as implying the feeling, "It's true because I say so, and I am a Captain in the Navy or a Colonel in the Air Force." Program Managers were often described as appearing to have this attitude, especially on their first appearance. If this is true, one possible cause might be the fact that just such self-assurance has helped these people to become the success in the service that they are. There are strong indications

from OLA and Congressional staffs that new Program Managers frequently come to Congress armed with technical knowledge and an aura of righteousness which irritates.

A related discrepancy between Congressional desires and perceived reality is that Congressional personnel fault the Navy in general for the apparent reluctance of its personnel to admit mistakes. At least some of this is probably due to the aforementioned Navy view that Congress's role is only to provide funding for military programs. Mistakes and errors are seen as something to be corrected in-house. Many Navy personnel interviewed did not feel mistakes were information which Congress needed to provide funding for future expenditures. Staff members mentioned that it would help "clear the air" if a Program Manager (or any Navy witness) would just admit that a mistake had been made rather than covering it up.

Program Managers were described by Congressional personnel as being only partially aware of other programs. Normally they were seen as knowing those programs with which they are competing for funding such as a like missile or airplane. However, Congressional and DOD interviewees frequently complained that Program Managers often failed to grasp the effect of a reduction in a complementary program on their program. To a certain extent they recognized that this is due to the demands on a Program Manager's time--he can't possibly be aware of every detail which everybody thinks he should. On the other hand, Program Managers hinted that the impression that they are unaware of complementary programs may be due to the Navy's policy that a witness not talk about the effects a reduction in some other program may have upon his program. Navy and other DOD witnesses are expected to espouse the "party line" [Ref. 29, p. 11, and Ref. 30, p. 1] and state that they have accepted the judgment

of their department on such matters. One researcher says this is to avoid allowing the Congress to see internal disagreement which they might use to learn information about programs [Ref. 31, p. 182].

It must be pointed out, too, that the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which created the executive budget demands "party line" answers unless Congressmen specifically ask for the witness's own viewpoints. There is a prescribed procedure which all Congressmen and staffs are aware of, which allows witnesses to give their private views [Ref. 30]. Some Congressmen complain, however, that they feel they don't see witnesses with truly dissenting views [Ref. 28].¹¹

The foregoing were some of the reasons given for general distrust of Program Managers by the Congress and staff. Other factors volunteered which interviewees admitted might have little to do with an individual Program Manager but still affect his program: Past experience with cost growth in Navy programs, general distrust of the military as a result of Vietnam, and disagreement with the overall objectives of the military. As mentioned in the previous section, another reason given for a lack of trust in the Program Manager comes from not knowing the Program Manager well, and the feeling that he can't know his program thoroughly. Many complained that Program Managers who are in their jobs for three years or less don't gain sufficient knowledge to understand all the problems involved until it is almost time to leave for a new job. Program Managers

¹¹ In a hearing witnessed by the authors [Ref. 32], Senator Proxmire voiced the complaint that when dissenting witnesses were allowed before Congress, they were often given instructions not to talk about those items of most interest to Congress and that if they did, their job might be in jeopardy.

that were somehow able to build this trust in spite of all these difficulties were described as dynamic, aggressive individuals who were able to convince Congress that they would, in fact, provide full and timely information.

4. Other Items

Many Congressional personnel interviewed saw the Navy, and DOD in general, as failing to settle their problems in-house, bringing them instead to the Congress for arbitration. At least one cause for this occurrence is a Congress which, in years past, intentionally designed the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure to encourage the presentation of differing views [Ref. 33]. The authors see a definite contradiction in the two trends in Congress: The one encouraging the airing of differences between and within the individual services, and the other discouraging these airings and complaining when the differences are brought to Congress for settlement.

This same contradiction may be seen within the Navy. Most Naval personnel interviewed felt that a united front of jointly approved information must be shown to Congress. However, there were some (including a few Program Managers) who felt that they could obtain more dollars for their program than was in the budget request by presenting a good case to Congress that contained new information.¹² In some cases the Navy as a whole has used this tactic.¹³

¹² The authors witnessed one Program Manager-initiated Congressional brief on a system which the Program Manager knew would not be in the next year's budget. The brief was an effort to spark Congressional interest in the program in hopes that Congress would insert funding.

¹³ It must be pointed out that efforts by the Navy to increase the money for given programs in FY 1973 were spectacularly ineffective. A study of FY 1973 action for ship construction, procurement of aircraft and missiles, other procurement, and RDT&E showed no increase over budget requests in over one hundred program categories [Ref. 34].

There is a fact of Navy life discussed by several Navy interviewees which might be said to almost encourage differing priorities being given the Congress, thereby unintentionally creating an image of a Navy asking Congress to arbitrate disputes. Because of the many tasks of the Navy, it has more programs and weapons systems than any of the other services. As has been discussed, each Program Manager, or appropriations sponsor, is primarily aware of the justification and analysis for his program. He will speak of the Navy's role in that light when justifying his program before Congress. If the justification for one program is presented too strongly, it could appear to negate the need for a seemingly supplementary program. Given the large numbers of programs, this could happen quite often.

The concept of having something to "give up" was, as we mentioned, espoused by DOD and non-DOD budgetary officials. They felt that there is an unspoken desire on the part of Congress for there to be a gentleman's agreement that there be some padding in the budget which is there solely for cutting and trading. They stated, however, that in the past, when items were being considered for cuts, the Navy generally has acted as if each and every item were equally critical to the national defense. A possible explanation for this appearance is that one of the thoughts behind the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is that all of the money requested is required to meet the perceived threat and that the budget represents the most cost-effective method of attaining this [Ref. 1]. If one adopts this line of reasoning alone, then one has nothing left in the budget to give up for the sake of ensuring the happiness of staff members and Congressmen who see their role as being budget cutters.

Another discrepancy between Congressional expectations and reality is related to the Congressional desire that Program Managers, and others in the military who work with Congress, remain in their jobs for longer periods of time. In fact, Congressional personnel in general criticized the relatively short tours of the Navy in all billets that interact with Congress. The surface cause of this discrepancy appears to be the desire on the part of the Navy to have officers in the Navy trained in a wide variety of areas.

5. Problems within the Naval System for Dealing with Congress

Sections IV. D. 1. through IV. D. 4. listed discrepancies between the Congressional expectations and reality, and listed some suggested causes for each discrepancy. There are, however, within the Navy structure for dealing with Congress some areas which were suggested by various interviewees as contributing to the generally stated dissatisfaction with the performance of Program Managers before Congress. These possible problems within the Navy's system are brought together in this Section. They represent the authors' synthesis of the viewpoints expressed to us by both Naval and Congressional personnel.

In Section IV. A., we suggested that an astute Program Manager might want to make use of background information about the committee before which he was appearing in order to tailor his presentation to a particular audience. Such information might include items like biographical data on the committee and staff members, description of interest areas of individuals involved, and even an intelligent guess as to what the committee or staff was actually seeking from the Program Manager. If the Program Manager is to get this information within the current Navy structure without extensive personal research, it will come

from OLA for the Armed Services Committees and from NavComPLia for the Appropriations Committees. To be effective in providing such information, OLA and NavComPLia personnel feel that they should be well versed in the inner workings of Congress. However, they point out that there is no requirement for personnel assigned to OLA or NavComPLia to have historical knowledge of Congressional actions, personalities, or even the Congressional structure. This is not to imply that the individuals filling these billets do not acquire some of this knowledge; they do, but strictly on their own initiative. However, they believe that time is lost while this knowledge is being acquired on the job.

Congressional staff members, DOD civilian personnel and non-DOD personnel suggested that it often takes years for Congressional knowledge, combined with hard work, to create trust in the individual by the Congressional participants. Such trust can be a useful tool, often leading to warnings from Congressional personnel of impending troubles or problem areas early enough to avoid adversity. The OLA (Congressional Committee Liaison Branch) tour of duty is only three years. (NavComPLia appears to do better on this score, tailoring its tours more to the effectiveness of the individual in the job.) The fixed tour length also means that those who can not develop this trust, but instead irritate the Congressional participants, are left in their billet until rotation time occurs. While it is true that Congress can have a person removed by expressing its displeasure to the appropriate people, we were told by both Naval and Congressional personnel that it usually requires some extremely infuriating action on the part of an individual to lead to his removal. It appears there is no method within the Navy to identify those individuals that interact with Congress who irritate, but don't anger.

A problem observed by the authors which is peculiar to NavComPLia is the fact that they do not summarize briefings. This means that each witness must appear before Appropriations briefings with little or no significant intelligence of the types of questions that have been asked of prior witnesses. It was pointed out to the authors by a former budgeting officer that one tactic used by the Appropriations Committees is to pick an area of interest to investigate in all agencies at the beginning of the year. If this is true, knowledge of the areas investigated in one area of the Navy could prove to be important preparation material for later Navy witnesses. Such a tactic appears to be foreign to those military personnel outside of OLA that we interviewed.

Both Congress and Navy Congressional Liaison personnel noted that the Navy allows requests for information to be delayed excessively thus prompting a second or third request from Congress. Upon final receipt of the reply, interviewees complained that the contents were often outdated and completely innocuous. OP 906 is viewed by others in the Navy system as allowing some requests for information to become slowed down or lost in their zeal to pursue requests which are perceived by them to be more important. This may help to create the image mentioned by Congress of a Navy reluctant to provide requested information.

A part of OP 906's responsibilities is to ensure consistency of information flowing to Congress from year to year, a requirement which demands either time to research past documents or an encyclopedic knowledge on the part of the person ensuring consistency, coupled with exposure to past occurrences. Since time for such research is at a premium, one way to ensure there is a rapid review of the material for consistency is for the reviewer to have knowledge of what transpired in the past. However, OP 906 also has a standard three-year tour.

In this section we have discussed the discrepancies between Congressional expectations and reality. We have also listed some of the possible causes. In the following sections we will list some of the effects of the discrepancies.

E. EFFECTS OF DISCREPANCIES

There are a number of effects from the various discrepancies discussed. Some of the effects are those as viewed specifically by Congressional personnel while others are effects which were seen by higher DOD personnel who could observe Navy-Congressional interactions in a semidetached manner. Finally, some of the effects are ones which the authors observed as a result of their research.

1. Know Congress

The lack of information that Program Managers have on the true workings of Congress frequently leads to the view by Program Managers that all committees are the same and that their interests are the same; therefore, preparations should be the same. Our research showed that nothing could be further from the truth. Each of the four committees discussed in this thesis has different members with varying interests and biases. What is probably more important than their actual differences is how they perceive themselves. Each committee sees itself in a different light, and they jealously guard their positions and what they see as their special interests. The lack of recognition of this fact by witnesses irritates and angers Congressmen. To illustrate this, one story was related to the authors of a Navy witness who complained, on being asked a question by the HAC, that he had already answered that question for the SASC the previous week. He was sternly lectured by the visibly angered Chairman that he had better learn that what had been said

to that "other" committee was of absolutely no interest to this committee and would he please answer the question.

DOD and Navy civilian personnel suggested that the failure of Program Managers to study the background of Congressmen and staffs before briefs and hearings often resulted in highly technical presentations. Congressmen and their staffs said that they sometimes have difficulty understanding such briefs and have little interest in them. They stated that they feel the Program Manager involved in such a brief has either unknowingly wasted their time or that he is trying to hide problem areas with technical facts. In either case the Program Manager has unnecessarily irritated the Congressional personnel involved. Often this leads to extra briefs/hearings being scheduled.¹⁴

The lack of recognition of the importance of the committee staff members to the Congressional system had several effects: Staff members felt Program Managers were frequently not prepared to give the proper information at a staff brief, either because they weren't given the areas of staff member interests or because they felt it was unimportant. Some Program Managers were seen by the staff as ignoring their requests for information even though the problem may be due to the lengthy time period required to process information through the liaison network. We were told that sometimes Program Managers gave information directly to Congressmen rather than staff members in the apparent belief that staff members were not capable of properly handling some sensitive information. This all leads to the feeling on the part of staff members that their importance

¹⁴ Staff members related that they often have had to reschedule Congressional briefs, and occasionally hearings, because witnesses were unprepared, unwilling, or unable to give the information needed in an understandable and usable form.

is being threatened. This, in turn, leads to their being extremely irritated with the individual Program Manager.¹⁵ Since staff members admit that they prepare most of the questions for the committee hearings and since they may write a considerable portion of the final bill and report, it would seem that irritating staff members might affect programs in many ways.

Frequently, failure to listen to the signals and desires of Congress is, to the Congressman, perhaps the most baffling failure that a governmental agency can make. As mentioned before, Congress considers itself one of the most important legislative bodies in the world. When someone, or some agency, continually ignores their wishes, they feel that their importance is being impugned. When a Navy Program Manager's attention is directed to a problem area, Congressional personnel stated that they expect some action to be taken. Frequently, they claim that they ask what action has been taken on an item since the previous year, only to find that, to all appearances, the previous advice, or signal, was ignored. The net effect as related by staff members is, at best a loss of confidence in the Program Manager and quite possibly complete rejection of the Program Manager and his program.

2. Be Honest and Provide Information

As has been mentioned, Congress sees Program Managers and the Navy in general as withholding complete and total answers to questions. As a result, Congressional personnel interviewed view those individuals

¹⁵ To give an example, one staff member revealed to the authors that he had not been given sensitive information about a specific project in time to avoid being caught uninformed by a Congressman. He mentioned that a discussion with an ASN followed, and that he now received all information on that project.

who don't give complete answers as being unresponsive to Congress and untrustworthy. Since they then suspect that information is being hidden, they feel their investigative efforts must be more thorough and, as a result, Congress and their staffs look at more programs in greater detail and consume more of a Program Manager's time.¹⁶

In Section IV. D. 2. it was pointed out that Congressional personnel are resentful of large numbers of witnesses appearing and then not speaking. They feel that the witness with the specialized knowledge they want is bound to be present in a "sea of blue" but that he isn't allowed to talk, or if permitted, he is constrained by the more senior witnesses present. Staff members stated that this adds to the impression that facts are being hidden and glossed over.

3. Characteristics of Program Managers

Where the characteristics of a Program Manager do not correspond to Congressional expectations, there is a loss of faith in that individual. (In general, the Program Manager concept itself is strongly approved by Congress as it does place a visible individual in charge of a program.) According to Appropriations staff members, such a loss of faith in a specific Program Manager can lead to his program being investigated in greater depth to see if the program can survive in spite of the Program Manager. They stated that if Congress is not firmly convinced of the need

¹⁶ Staff members had almost universal criteria for the selection of programs to be investigated: Large dollar programs, new programs, those which have been highlighted in the news and sparked controversy, programs which are in the area of interest and expertise of individual committee members, programs which have significant changes, and those of interest to the individual staff member due to some personal knowledge.

for the program, or of its ability to survive a poor Program Manager, they may cut the program significantly due to this loss of trust in the Program Manager.

4. Other Items

As has been pointed out, the Navy tries to present a common front to the Congress. Two divergent views were expressed to the authors about the effects of internal problems and arguments being brought by individuals to Congress for solution. If an individual Congressman or staff member is given a cause which is counter to the current administration's position and which he can successfully promote, it may make him feel important and grateful to the individual, or group, who provided the information.¹⁷ In general, however, individual campaigns for programs were described by Congressional personnel and DOD civilian personnel as creating unwanted and unneeded tensions in Congress. This is seen by the members as especially undesirable when such tensions are created in the HAC.¹⁸ [Ref. 35]. When an individual Program Manager can be credited with creating such tension, he may have also created a pool of resentment which may overflow in the action of a committee reviewing his program at a later date.

The shortness of Program Manager's tours was consistently mentioned as contributing to the fact that no lasting trust of Program Managers

¹⁷ Many people in the Navy expressed to the authors the idea that the only reason Congressmen and staff members desired information about programs was to enable them to find a "cause" they could fight for, or against, successfully and, in the process, make a name for themselves. It should be noted that if a Congressman supports a cause and is made to look bad, then he probably will not trust that individual, or group, again.

¹⁸ An indication of the rarity of HAC members successfully dissenting with the committee in public can be seen in the reaction to Representative Robert Sikes' (D-Fla.) successful attempt to have monies for hiring civilians to do KP put in the House Appropriations Bill for FY 1973. These monies had been previously cut by the committee. Several people interviewed were surprised that Rep. Sikes had been successful and viewed it as a sign of decreasing power of the HAC.

is built up by Congress. Although many Program Managers can convince Congressmen and Congressional staffs of their personal trustworthiness, this was described as normally taking a year or more. Congress must have time to assess the individual, to observe how he prepares for them and how he responds to them. Each Program Manager must "sell" himself to Congress and build his own trust.¹⁹

The ultimate trust that can be placed in a Program Manager can be seen in the case of Admiral Rickover; Congress has such total faith in him that they refuse to let the Navy retire him.

5. Net Effect

The ultimate effect of these irritations and the loss of trust of Program Managers was repeatedly described as a general distrust of the Navy and its programs. This is not to say that such distrust of the Navy is created by Program Managers alone; many others in the Navy were mentioned as contributing to this situation. Congressional personnel and high-ranking DOD personnel [Ref. 36] state that the Navy currently has the poorest reputation before Congress of any of the DOD components. A lack of trust is seen as creating an atmosphere in which Congressional personnel are overly suspicious of Navy Program Managers. This is viewed by many of the staff members interviewed as the real reason for cuts in funding for programs, stretch-out of programs, and, in a few cases, the

¹⁹ Although at least one Program Manager thought that the trust the Congress seemed to have in him would transfer to his relief, the authors' impression is that Congressmen and staff members place the trust in an individual and not a position.

outright cancellation of programs.²⁰ It is also of interest that many Congressional personnel stated that a poor presentation by the Program Manager could cause the committee to kill or seriously hurt his program. This is especially true in the case of a new program with which Congress had little familiarity and where they must depend on the initial briefs for impressions and facts.²¹

²⁰ The general explicit reasons which were given by Congressional personnel for cuts in funding for programs were that they weren't needed, there was waste in the program, the program conflicted with some other program or was fulfilling a need which had already been sufficiently met. However, many underlying reasons (which the authors suggest may be the real reasons) were specifically mentioned, including punitive cuts for not listening to Congress, cuts made because of the lack of faith in a specific Program Manager or cuts made because a Program Manager irritated the Congress. It must be noted that punitive cuts were made within the specific programs which Congress wanted to punish, although Congressional personnel sometimes admitted to wanting to punish the entire Navy system because of the accumulation of irritating items.

²¹ The authors were told by a HAC staff member of a specific new program which the HAC killed one year because the brief seemed to indicate that little real thought had gone into the program. On later investigation, they found that the program was, in fact, well managed but had been presented poorly. As a result, the committee was prepared to refund the program in conference if it were funded in the Senate version. However, the Navy failed to reclama and thus a program was lost because of a poor presentation.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The authors feel that the questions which were posed at the beginning of this thesis have either been answered fully, or in such a manner that other researchers will have some initial findings to guide them.

First and foremost, there are extensive Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions; far more than any one individual interviewed knew, or at least was willing to admit to us. Interactions run the gamut from a Program Manager who occasionally answers a written question for a Congressman or his staff to the Program Manager who briefs committee staff members and Congressmen frequently and testifies before the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees several times a year. The frequency and level of interactions depend upon a number of factors including the size and value of the program, its stage of development, the amount of adverse press coverage, the special interests of Congressmen and staff members, and the apparent administration of the project including the Congressional assessment of the Program Manager. The number of these interactions appears to be increasing, perhaps as a result of the increased stature of the Navy Program Managers. Also, there are indications that Congress desires to become more involved in the managerial and decision-making process of weapons acquisition, possibly because they feel forced to by what they perceive as past DOD-Navy mismanagement of programs.²²

²² This is especially true of the SASC, which appears to desire to become very involved in TACAIR, and of the HASC which appears to be building a great interest and expertise in Navy shipbuilding.

There exists a formal organization to convey facts and information between the Navy Program Managers and Congress. This organization consists of NavComPLia (for the Appropriations Committees) and OLA (for all other committees) as the direct contact points with Congress. From these two offices, contacts are made through OP-906 to the Legislative Liaison Offices of the Systems Commands and then to the Program Managers. (The Legislative Liaison offices are often excluded from this process.) This organization is intended to convey information for the entire Navy, not just for Program Managers. The OLA portion of the organization is also intended to gather intelligence information, such as Congressional trends, desires, and personalities; but NavComPLia does not perform the same functions. Due to historical and personality reasons, most of this information is not being used by, or offered to, Program Managers. The system is layered with many checks and balances, and information takes time to pass from the Program Manager to the Congress; we were told by Congressional personnel that upon arrival it is so sanitized that it appears virtually meaningless to the Congressmen or his staff. Thus, it appears that a system which is supposed to ensure timely flow of information plus correct and cordial relations with Congress actually might be hindering both efforts where Program Managers are involved.

Program Managers, as a group, are seen by Congressional personnel as having a poor understanding of the mechanizations and personalities of Congress. Our research indicated that this view was largely correct.

The authors feel that Program Managers are not given adequate information for dealing with Congress, often because they are unaware that it is

needed or that dealing with Congress involves a different type of "politics" than does dealing with the DOD-Navy hierarchy. In addition, our research shows that many Program Managers have little time to devote to events they see as incidental to the management of their program, such as preparing for Congressional appearances, and most appear to rely instead on superior technical knowledge of their program and their standard brief.

We found some Program Managers who were exceptions to the above remarks; who feel it is important to guide their program through the Congressional maze, and who spend considerable time preparing for Congress. In addition to managing their programs, they research the backgrounds and interests of Congressmen and staff members, they read past hearings, and they learn of the relationships and importance of the different committees and their staffs. Some, who have fast-moving, trouble-plagued programs, avoid the lengthy sanitizing formal information passing process and pass information to Congress by other means. However, this is the exception rather than the rule.

Conclusions on the effects of Program Manager-Congressional interactions can only be stated as possible conclusions for which there is some degree of evidence. With this reservation in mind, it appears that the Program Manager-Congressional interactions, as seen by Congress, are generally poor. Program Managers do not appear before committees and staffs as often as desired by Congress because the Navy frequently sends other people to discuss the program. When Program Managers do appear, we were told by Congressional personnel that they frequently do not have the information actually desired. One interviewee suggested that Program Managers are uncertain what Congress wants to know and in what

manner they want the information to be presented, so they tell Congress what the Navy wants Congress to know, and in a manner which is most comfortable to the Program Manager--a highly technical one. The lack of proper preparation for briefs, and occasionally for testimony, has in the past, led to cuts in programs, stretching-out of programs, and increased investigation (which is often viewed as meddling) into programs. (See Section IV. E. 5.) The Navy in general is viewed by Congressional personnel and DOD civilians as having a poor "track record" before Congress.

It must be stated that, in spite of the ill will that this research has discovered, the Navy continues to receive more funding for procurement than any of the other services. The authors hypothesize, however, that this is due largely to two causes: According to Congressional personnel the history of Navy-Congressional relations prior to the mid-1960's is generally good. It would appear entirely possible that the Navy is currently drawing on this bank of goodwill, and is being protected by a few senior friends in the Congress. This is certainly a potential topic for further research. Secondly, authorizations and appropriations reports show that Congress still perceives a threat which must be met and in many cases the Navy is seen as the best way to meet the threat. It should be noted, however, that in the possible neo-isolation which may occur following Vietnam, the threat may not seem so urgent to Congress. Congressional action on the Navy defense budget in the next few years will indicate the validity of this observation.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is the contention of the authors that Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions can be improved. In that vein, recommendations are submitted, both general and specific. Though they are tentative, we feel they provide a basis for study and discussion. Some of the recommendations are for the Navy as a whole and are designed to affect overall Navy-Congressional interactions, while others apply specifically to Program Managers. As stated in the introduction, the recommendations and the body of the thesis are not viewed by the authors as providing the ultimate answer to Congressional relations. Rather, they are an effort to highlight some of the problems and to suggest a first stage in an iterative process of searching for solutions.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NAVY

A specific suggestion to promote better Navy-Congressional relationships is the streamlining of the OLA-NavComPLia-OP 906 system. We would not recommend, as others have, combining OLA and NavComPLia; we feel that the separation is necessary if for no other reason than the expressed desire of the Appropriations Committees. However, we feel that there should be a greater interchange of information and intelligence between these two offices than there now is. If NavComPLia is to gather and disseminate information, which we feel they should, they need more people, aid, and assistance. It appears from our research that OLA needs a better system to gather, advertise the availability of, and disseminate intelligence information to those preparing to testify or

brief. As recommended by the liaison personnel themselves, the entire liaison system needs to be streamlined to promote more rapid flow of requests and information. A suggestion was that OP 906 be removed from the system or assigned only the responsibility of clearing information and disseminating requests rather than the multiple missions they now have.

It was suggested by many that tours in this type of duty should be open-ended; if any individual performs well in the system, consider the possibility of a six- or seven-year tour, with appropriate compensations, in order that the trust and knowledge developed can be utilized to good advantage by the Navy. If, however, there is evidence that an individual is objectionable to, or irritates, Congressional personnel, it was suggested that he be removed to a billet where there was no Congressional contact. We recognize that there are factors other than the desire to build and make use of Congressional trust of an individual which effect tour length. At least one is the general policy of the Navy to try to ensure that all officers have a broad background of knowledge and experience. We would recommend that further research investigate and compare the benefits gained by a firm policy of short tours with those which might be gained by allowing longer tours in the liaison system.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROGRAM MANAGER SYSTEM

Recognizing that Program Managers have different styles as well as varying contacts with Congress, we realize that there can be no textbook solutions to the problems. Nevertheless, there are certain recommendations which our research shows should apply to all who have contact with Congressional committees and their staffs.

Perhaps the most important recommendation is that the Program Manager be made fully aware of the importance of Congressional committee staff members to the overall system. Some Program Managers are often reluctant to provide information to personnel they may see as underlings. Past history shows that staff members can indeed cut programs if they are not fully satisfied. Some senior Naval officers may rightfully feel that they should not work on a staff level. However, our research shows that staff members feel they must at least be kept informed of the information being passed to Congressmen so that the staff members don't find themselves surprised by the Congressmen.

It would appear important that a Program Manager recognize that preparation for Congressional hearings and briefings is not exactly the same as the preparation for any other briefings. We would recommend he study the background and interests of all the people before whom he is going to appear and, in his preparations, slant the presentation toward the interests of the particular Congressional audience. Some of our interviewees pointed out that a Program Manager should be aware of the differences in committees, of which ones have closed hearings, which are open, and what that means to him. Further, it would be helpful to a Program Manager to know why he is appearing--is it to make a record, to provide information, or to be a public target for some Congressman? Some of this information, as well as the types of questions being asked and by whom, may be available through OLA or NavComPLia.

If he is to ensure consistent answers from year to year, it would help the Program Manager to study the previous hearings and reports to ensure that he understands the questions asked and can adequately discuss changes

which have occurred since the past year. The maintenance and study of files of statements that have been officially made about his program would be beneficial, both for the Program Manager's protection and to ensure that his relief can provide consistent, correct answers.

While we have made an effort to indicate that the Program Manager should always be allowed to speak for his program, we recognize that, due to policy or sensitivity, Program Managers will not always be given the opportunity to speak. To prevent someone speaking for his program with improper knowledge, Program Managers could keep appropriate Navy and DOD personnel informed when possible, in writing, of current program status.

As has been recommended [Ref. 37], longer tours for Program Managers are appropriate. The Program Manager would then not only be more knowledgeable about his program, and in all likelihood be better able to manage it, but also, he would have time to cultivate and maintain the trust of Congress. As with Congressional Liaison billets, we recommend that further study be made of the idea that the Program Manager of a sensitive, controversial program must be able to relate well with Congress; and if he doesn't, be replaced as quickly and surely as would be the case if he managed his program poorly.

Finally, we recommend that the Program Manager give considerable thought to the problems of information dissemination to the Congress. On the one hand, we have the weight of the Presidential, DOD, and Navy hierarchy which desires that minimal adverse information be given to the Congress. Backing this desire is the whole concept of executive budgeting. To defy this desire may encourage a disastrous curtailment of the

Program Manager's career. On the other hand, there is the Congressional system which wants unsanitized information to better enable it to judge programs, needs, and Program Managers. To not give this information quickly and willingly, or worse, to be caught in a half-truth or evasion can lead to program cuts or curtailment. There is no easy solution to this problem, and the only recommendation the authors can make is that the Program Manager thoroughly study the consequences of his decision each time he is asked to provide information to Congress.

APPENDIX A

PROGRAM OFFICES SOLICITED FOR INFORMATION

<u>Project Number</u>	<u>Project Name</u>
PM1	SSP
PM2	ULMS
PM4	ASW
PM6/8	NACIS
PM7	REWSON
PM13	SSN 688
PM15	SASI
PM16	Navy Space Project
PM17	Navy Surface Effect Ship
PM19	Mine Warfare Project
PME116	SATCOM
PME117	Special Communications
PME117-21	SANGUINE
PME117-22	TACAMO
PME119	OMEGA
PME121	Navy Special Sensor
PME124	Undersea Surveillance
PMA231	E2/ATDS
PMA234	A-6/EA-6
PMA235	A-7
PMA238	VAST
PMA240	P-3
PMA241	F-14/Phoenix
PMA242	ARM/SHRIKE
PMA243	WALLEYE
PMA244	S-3A
PMA245	CONDOR
PMA246	Airborne Weapons
PMA248	JIFDATS
PMA249	JEZEBEL (DIFAR)

PMA253	Air Electronic Warfare Project
PMA257	HARRIER
PMA258	HARPOON
PMA259	SIDEWINDER (AIM9-L) JOINT PROJECT
PMA260	CARRIER AIR SUPPORT
PMA261	CH-53E
PMA262	SPARROW III MISSILE
PMS300	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft
PMS301	1220 lb. Steam Propulsion Plant Improvement
PMS302	SONAR
PMS376	Spanish Support
PMS377	LHA
PMS378	Anti-Air Warfare
PMS380	Anti-Submarine Warfare
PMS383	Auxillary Ship
PMS389	DD-963/DDG
PMS391	Oceanographic, Mine Patrol and Special Purpose Ship Acquisition
PMS392	CVAN
PMS392-A1	CVAN 68/69
PMS395	Deep Submergence Systems Project
PMS396	ULMS Acquisition
PMS397	NAVSHIPS SASI
PMS398	TEMP/REWSON
PMS399	Patrol Escort Ship Acquisition Project
PM0402	MK 48
PM0402	APM, MK 48
PM0403	Surface Missile Systems
PM0403-10	Terrier
PM0403-20	Tartar
PM0403-30	Talos
PM0403-40	AEGIS
PM0403-50B	Point Defense
PM0403-60	SAMID
PM0405	High Energy Laser

PM05515

PM0701

PHALANX

CAPTOR/PAROSS

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE ON PROGRAM MANAGER-CONGRESSIONAL INTERACTIONS

1. Have you testified or been required to prepare to testify (including acting as a back-up witness) before a formal hearing of any of the following Congressional committees or their subcommittees? If a subcommittee of the full committee, name the subcommittee

	YES	NO	Name of subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee	(31)	(19)	_____
House Armed Services Committee	(31)	(19)	_____
Senate Appropriations Committee	(25)	(25)	_____
House Appropriations Committee	(24)	(26)	_____

If you answered "NO" to all four committees, go to question 4.

2. Indicate the frequency of such testimony or preparation for testimony.

Once	(6)*
Annually	(21)
Frequently	(6)

3. Prior to testifying, do you feel it is most beneficial to concentrate on technical knowledge, on techniques of presentation, or both?

Technical Knowledge	(14)
Techniques	(2)
Both	(18)

4. Have you presented a briefing (as differentiated from formal testimony for a hearing) to any of the following committees, their subcommittees, or some member(s) of the subcommittee? If a subcommittee or member thereof, indicate which subcommittee or individual.

	YES	NO	Subcommittee or Member
Senate Armed Services Committee	(27)	(23)	_____
House Armed Services Committee	(18)	(32)	_____
Senate Appropriations Committee	(13)	(37)	_____
House Appropriations Committee	(14)	(36)	_____

If you answered "NO" to all four committees, go to question 7.

* Numbers in brackets are the total responses for each question. Note that they do not always total fifty, the number of responses received, as many questions were not answered.

5. Indicate the frequency of such a briefing.

Once	(8)
Annually	(12)
Frequently	(12)

6. Prior to presenting the brief, do you feel it is most beneficial to concentrate on technical knowledge, on techniques of presentation, or both?

Technical Knowledge	(16)
Techniques	(1)
Both	(15)

7. Have you had dealings, such as briefings, responses to letters, telephone conversations, etc., with the staff members of any of the following committees?

	YES	NO
Senate Armed Services Committee	(32)	(18)
House Armed Services Committee	(29)	(21)
Senate Appropriations Committee	(19)	(31)
House Appropriations Committee	(22)	(28)

If "YES," indicate what form the dealings were and approximately how often in a year.**

Senate Armed Services

House Armed Services

Senate Appropriations

House Appropriations

8. Of the four committees discussed, do you feel it is more important to allocate your effort into "selling" your program to a specific Committee?

YES	(8)
NO	(34)

If "YES," which committee?

9. In recent years there have been complaints that Congress does not look at programs or projects, but rather, looks at line items. How do you feel these committees (including their staffs) concentrate their efforts?

** Answers to this question were varied and difficult to present in a summarized form; however, they positively indicated that dealings do occur.

	Line Item	Program or Project
Senate Armed Services Committee	(6)	(29)
House Armed Services Committee	(5)	(30)
Senate Appropriations Committee	(18)	(14)
House Appropriations Committee	(16)	(16)

10. Do you feel the following committees (including their staffs) look at, and judge, your program in isolation or in comparison to other programs of a similar nature?

	Isolation	Comparison
Senate Armed Services Committee	(7)	(26)
House Armed Services Committee	(10)	(22)
Senate Appropriations Committee	(5)	(25)
House Appropriations Committee	(4)	(27)

11. Have you had dealings with any other committees? If so, which ones.

YES	(3)
NO	(47)

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Unclassified

2b. GROUP

REPORT TITLE

INTERACTIONS OF NAVY PROGRAM MANAGERS WITH
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THEIR STAFFS

DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and, inclusive dates)

Master's Thesis; March, 1973

AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

R. Crist Berry, LT, USN

Daniel E. Peckham, CDR, USN

REPORT DATE

March, 1973

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

88

7b. NO. OF REFS

41

1. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

3. PROJECT NO.

9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned
this report)

0. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

13. ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the interactions between Navy Program Managers and the United States Congress. It describes the amount and type of interactions, and the formal organization in the Navy to deal with them.

Initial research was based on telephone and written surveys. This was followed by extensive personal interviews with Congressional staff members, Congressmen, DOD civilians, Congressional liaison personnel, and Navy Program Managers.

Congressional expectations or norms for their interactions with Program Managers are discussed, as well as Congressional views of what actually occurs. The effects of the discrepancies between Congressional expectations and Congressional images of how Program Managers act are described. Finally, some recommendations are made to help improve Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions.

Unclassified

Security Classification

14 KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Navy-Congressional interactions						
Congressional-Navy interactions						
Congressional committees						
Congressional committee staffs						
Navy Program Managers						
Navy Program Manager-Congressional interactions						
Navy Congressional liaison system						
Office of Legislative Affairs						
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